

March 11, 1963

Dear Stuart:

On second thought I feel that I should not send you the Cuba paper I mentioned, for all the obvious reasons. However, I can summarize my views very briefly, as follows:

1. I felt and said emphatically that we should not take military action by air strike or invasion at least until we had used the Organization of American States and the Security Council of the United Nations to bring about the peaceful removal of the threat from the nuclear missiles. This is what was done.

2. I favored the quarantine against additional arms shipments to Cuba, but opposed including petrol, oil and lubricants in the first instance. This is what was done.

3. I proposed that in the event that the missiles were rendered inoperable as a result of the OAS-UN proceedings, but had not been withdrawn from the island, that the US should be prepared to negotiate for their withdrawal and for the demilitarization of Cuba by the withdrawal of all Russian forces. And for any such comprehensive result, we should be prepared to pay the price in the context of mutual evacuation of bases. I think the confusion arose because somebody interpreted my position as offering to trade a base in exchange for rendering the missiles inoperable, i.e., removing the gun from our head, rather than the larger package of removing the Russians from Cuba. But obviously the US has long pursued a policy of refusing to negotiate under threat and I had no such idea at the time.

Perhaps on another visit we can amplify this in greater detail, as well as many other proposals that emerged during that week, if you wish.

It was good to see you and I hope you will not hesitate to let me know if I can do anything further at Carnegie or elsewhere.

Cordially,

Adlai E. Stevenson

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